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Single Idea 6503

[filed under theme 17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind ]

Full Idea

It is generally conceded by reductive physicalists that a state of the brain cannot be intrinsically about anything, for intentionality is not an intrinsic property of anything, so there can be no internal objects for a physicalist.

Gist of Idea

Physicalism cannot allow internal intentional objects, as brain states can't be 'about' anything

Source

Howard Robinson (Perception [1994], V.4)

Book Ref

Robinson,Howard: 'Perception' [Routledge 2001], p.136

A Reaction

Perhaps it is best to say that 'aboutness' is not a property of physics. We may say that a brain state 'represents' something, because the something caused the brain state, but representations have to be recognised

The 26 ideas from 'Perception'

6480 Sense-data do not have any intrinsic intentionality [Robinson,H]
6482 For idealists and phenomenalists sense-data are in objects; representative realists say they resemble objects [Robinson,H]
6481 If intentional states are intrinsically about other things, what are their own properties? [Robinson,H]
6484 Most moderate empiricists adopt Locke's representative theory of perception [Robinson,H]
6485 When a red object is viewed, the air in between does not become red [Robinson,H]
6494 If objects are not coloured, and neither are sense-contents, we are left saying that nothing is coloured [Robinson,H]
6499 Shape can be experienced in different ways, but colour and sound only one way [Robinson,H]
6500 If secondary qualities match senses, would new senses create new qualities? [Robinson,H]
6497 We say objects possess no intrinsic secondary qualities because physicists don't need them [Robinson,H]
6519 Locke's solidity is not matter, because that is impenetrability and hardness combined [Robinson,H]
6515 An explanation presupposes something that is improbable unless it is explained [Robinson,H]
6517 If all possibilities are equal, order seems (a priori) to need an explanation - or does it? [Robinson,H]
6521 Representative realists believe that laws of phenomena will apply to the physical world [Robinson,H]
6520 If reality just has relational properties, what are its substantial ontological features? [Robinson,H]
6522 Phenomenalism can be theistic (Berkeley), or sceptical (Hume), or analytic (20th century) [Robinson,H]
6502 Can we reduce perception to acquisition of information, which is reduced to causation or disposition? [Robinson,H]
6504 For physicalists, the only relations are spatial, temporal and causal [Robinson,H]
6503 Physicalism cannot allow internal intentional objects, as brain states can't be 'about' anything [Robinson,H]
6505 Sense-data are rejected because they are a veil between us and reality, leading to scepticism [Robinson,H]
6506 'Sense redly' sounds peculiar, but 'senses redly-squarely tablely' sounds far worse [Robinson,H]
6507 Adverbialism sees the contents of sense-experience as modes, not objects [Robinson,H]
6511 If there are only 'modes' of sensing, then an object can no more be red or square than it can be proud or lazy. [Robinson,H]
6508 Sense-data leads to either representative realism or phenomenalism or idealism [Robinson,H]
6509 Representative realists believe some properties of sense-data are shared by the objects themselves [Robinson,H]
6513 Would someone who recovered their sight recognise felt shapes just by looking? [Robinson,H]
6512 Secondary qualities have one sensory mode, but primary qualities can have more [Robinson,H]